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http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/13/1/40RESEARCH Open AccessDetermining the impacts of hospital cost-sharing
on the uninsured near-poor households in
Vietnam
Duong Anh Vuong1*, Steffen Flessa3, Paul Marschall3, Son Thai Ha1, Khue Ngoc Luong1 and Reinhard Busse2Abstract
Objectives: The study objective was to identify the size of different hospital financing sources for different hospital
services and their impact on the uninsured.
Methods: A panel dataset of 84 public general hospitals (2005–2008) with cross-section data on hospital activity
and hospital revenue was created and used to calculate unit costs of different hospital services by applying multiple
regression models. The resulting risk of catastrophic health expenditure (CHE) was estimated based on official
income statistics.
Results: Average user fees (UF) for outpatient visits and inpatient bed days were US$4.13 and US$20.27, while
actual full costs (AFC) were US$8.41 and US$36.66, respectively. These unit costs were 2.5 times higher in hospitals
at the central versus the provincial level. UF for surgical inpatient bed days were 3.6 times that of non-surgical
treatments (US$47.50 vs. 12.87) and AFC 5.0 times (US$101.72 vs. 20.08). UF accounted for 44.6%-77.9% of the AFC,
the rest (22.1%-55.4%) was provided by direct government support (DGS). One surgical inpatient treatment at either
central or provincial hospital level and one non-surgical inpatient treatment at central hospital level, immediately
pushed uninsured near-poor households at risk of CHE.
Conclusions: Around 45% of hospital AFC was paid by DGS, the larger rest by UF. UF have become a great
financial burden on the uninsured near-poor households, who have to pay for these out-of-pocket and therefore
may not utilize even necessary services. If the rate of DGS were reduced, this would have the effect of increasing
UF, but the savings to Government could be spent on subsidizing insurance to ensure that a larger part of the
population can cover UF through insurance, especially the near-poor households.
Keywords: Cost-sharing, Hospital unit cost, User fee, Catastrophic health expenditure, VietnamIntroduction
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is currently in the
process of implementing major health care reforms. One
major element of these reforms is a shift from a centrally
planned system where health care services were pro-
vided to the population free of charge, to the decentra-
lized and contracted social health insurance (SHI)
model. The introduction of hospital cost-sharing under
the mechanism of a fee-for-service scheme was started
in 1989 [1,2], which aimed to improve financial capacity* Correspondence: vuongad@gmail.com
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orand sustainability of these health care institutions result-
ing in higher quality and reliability of care. There have
been major achievements, such as new health technol-
ogy development, better health care service provision,
increasing financial support for hospital performance
and relief of the financial burden on the government.
However, in the process of ongoing reform, a mix of
payments for health care services consisting of contribu-
tions from the state budget and “user fees”, which are
either covered by SHI as third party payments (TPP) or
out-of-pocket (OOP), developed, which caused a major
controversy. Objections to the reform include (i) that it
might reduce necessary utilization by the poor, who may
not be able to afford the health care services; and (ii)Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited.
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access to hospital services is unclear, since there is no
clear policy to demarcate responsibility among the state,
health insurance and service users [3-5]. The question
remains of how much of the hospital service costs is
now financed by user fees and what the impacts of this
are on the service users, in particular those who are
uninsured and have to pay by OOP. Does it lead to
“catastrophic health expenditure” (CHE)? This question
will be explored and answered in this paper by looking
at the revenues and costs of two main hospital services,
namely outpatient visits and inpatient stays for both
surgical and non-surgical patients and for both central
and provincial hospitals.
Background
The current health care system was established in the
northern part of Vietnam by the late 1950s, then in the
south after reunification in 1975. The health care system
was formed according to the four administrative levels
of the state. These are, firstly, the central level, then the
provinces, which are in turn divided into districts and
communes. At the central level there are 41 hospitals
(18 general and 23 specialized); at the provincial level
there are 340 hospitals (124 general and 216 specialized);
and there are 609 district general hospitals. One health
commune station exists in each commune at the grass-
roots [6-8].
As in most countries in Central-Eastern Europe and
Central Asia, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in
the late 1980s, the country faced a socio-economic
crisis due to a sudden cut of foreign aid, and free health
care provision to the whole population was no longer
available. The state budget is only sufficient to support
for public health facilities in some main categories of
salaries, administrative management, equipment, main-
tenance, consumables, and a small number of hospital
fee exemptions for the very poor or vulnerable groups of
patients [9-11]. The rest has been covered by the so called
‘User Fee’, which was introduced by the Vietnamese
Government by the Ordinance of Private Medical and
Pharmaceutical Practices and the Policy on Hospital
Partial Fees. The user fee was first introduced in 1989
for inpatient services, with a partial hospital fee, then
expanded to all in- and outpatient services. It allows
hospitals to collect a fee, according to a fee-for-service
(FFS) scheme, for certain services including consult-
ation, drugs, consumables, blood infusions, diagnostic
procedures, operative procedures, and hospital bed
utilization [11]. The ranges of these services’ fee were
issued by the Ministry of Health, with the basic thresh-
old determined for each relevant administrative level.
The local authorities take it as a basis to specify the
precise fee for each service, in relation to the technicalcapacity of their hospital and their local community’s
ability to pay [3,4,12,]. The hospitals at the central level
normally receive more investment and are better equipped
with technology; and being the highest level in the referral
hierarchy, they logically receive patients with more severe
illnesses. Consequently, the highest level of the central
hospitals has a higher cost rate compared to provincial or
district hospital levels for the same service [13].
In short, funding to hospitals is a combination of two
main sources: state budget (bed-norm based provision)
and user fees [12]. The state budget is, as in most devel-
oping and some industrialized countries, transferred to
the hospitals in the form of line-item allocations from
government health authorities, the rate of provision
depending on the wealth of each province [14,15]; these
allocations are meant to cover the fixed costs of the hos-
pitals, especially for personnel and maintenance. There
are two main sources of UF payments, which are meant
to cover the variable costs: TPP and OOP payments. In
2007, TPP comprised 49% of population, which was
made up by statutory health insurance for employees
with 9% of the population, free health care for the poor
(HCFP) with 18%, free health care for children under
6 years of age with 11%, and another 11% by voluntary
health insurance [16]; OOP payments are made by those
with no health insurance.
The free HCFP policy was started since following
“Decision 139” of the Prime Minister on “health exam-
ination and treatment for the poor” in 2002 which
provides free health insurance for the poor who were
defined as those with a total income per year under
2,400,000VND in rural and 3,120,000VND in urban
areas (by purchasing power parity [PPP] in 2002, equal to
US$405; US$527, respectively) [17,18]. The HCFP was
rather successful in achieving positive outcomes with a
positive impact on increasing overall health care service
utilization; reducing OOP expenditure for health care of
the poor and the risk of catastrophic OOP spending
[5,19]. However, aside from the defined poor households
who were provided free health insurance, the near-poor
households are now of the greatest concern for the gov-
ernment in regard to health insurance provision.
The near-poor households are defined as having an
income between 201–260,000VND/head/month in rural
and 261–338,000VND/head/month in urban areas; in
the estimation of the average annual income of the near-
poor by PPP, in 2008 it was equal to US$420 per head
for both urban and rural groups [20]. The near-poor are
roughly estimated to account for 14% of the population
[21]. The risk of this group for CHE is now at the higher
than for the poor; Nguyen and colleagues found that 24%
of them have to borrow money to pay for outpatient treat-
ment, compared to 20% of the poor and 12% of others
[22]. The government made a policy to subsidize 50% of
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holds, but 90% of them are not yet covered [23].
Methods
Data set
As no patient-level data were available, we had to use
aggregate statistics from hospitals, which formed the basis
for our analysis. The data used in this study are thus
facility-based data of annual statistical reports, extracted
from the annual hospital statistical reports collected and
administered by Ministry of Health (Department of
Medical Service Administration), over 4 years (2005–2008).
By regulation, every hospital has to annually submit
the hospital statistical report to the Ministry of Health
(by electronic mail or on paper). However, each year
about 15-20% of the observations were not available.
The missing reports were those sent by post where the
address may have been incorrect or the data adminis-
trators were not able to manually enter all data into
the database at the MOH. General hospitals at the
central and provincial levels which have submitted a
minimum of 4 year reports to the Ministry of Health
were selected for this study. The set of available data
included 84 general hospitals (76 provincial hospitals,
8 central hospitals) with a total of 336 observations.
Private hospitals were excluded as our purpose is to
establish the share of different financial sources for the
public hospital unit costs.
A panel dataset was generated including out- and in-
patient flows; treatment and care procedures; and
hospital revenue from user fees and state budget. To
balance the value of local currency (VND) by years and
to be suitable for international benchmarking, hospital
income figures were adjusted by PPP to US dollars
(PPP in 2008: 7,688; 2007: 6,484; 2006: 6,158; 2005:
5,919) [17]. Unit costs of hospital services are defined
in the current study as unit cost of outpatient visits
and hospital stays (operationalized as inpatient bed
days). The inpatient bed days were further categorized
into surgical and non-surgical cases, depending on
whether patients had received an operation or not
[24,25]. A further division was done between hospitals
at provincial and central level.
As the data provided only contained aggregate revenue
received by the hospitals, we had to rely on the following
assumption to calculate costs from revenue: Based on
the fact that (a) all financial sources in the processing
procedures that can contribute to final outputs are
value-added [26] and (b) all public hospitals are non-
profit organizations and must therefore balance revenue
and costs, the revenue was substituted for costs in ana-
lyzing cost units. Costs were classified into three differ-
ent categories: revenue from user fees (UF) as a proxy
for variable costs, the state budget revenue as a proxyfor fixed costs, especially maintenance and personnel,
and actual full cost (AFC) as additionally including
depreciation of capital.
The hospital revenue from UF revenue was available
as being collected by TPP or OOP; and total revenue
was equally available as the combination of UF revenue,
bed-norm based provision of state budget, donation and
others (generally called state budget). To calculate AFC,
based on previous studies, we estimated that the annual
depreciation rate of capital investment on equipment and
buildings added 8.5% to total revenue [13,27,28]. The state
budget plus the annual depreciation of capital investment
(as these are only public hospitals) accounted for the
direct share contributed by the government (the so-
called direct government support (DGS)).
The three different categories of revenue, and respect-
ive costs, can be displayed by formulas as follows:
UF R≈
P
Variable costs ¼
P
Cost of consultation; drug; consumable;
infusion; blood; diagnosed test procedures; operation
procedures; hospital bed use
Total R¼UF RþStateBudget R≈
P
Variable costs
þ
P
Fixcosts1
¼
P
Variable costs
þ
P
Cost of maintenance; salaries=wages; management=operation
AFC¼Total R x 1:085≈
P
Variable costs
þ
P
Fixcosts1
þ
P
Fixcosts2
¼
P
Variable costs
þ
P
Fixcosts1
þ
P
Cost of depreciation on equipments; depreciation on buildings
The results of UF for each unit of hospital services
were judged in relation to the concept of households at
risk of CHE, especially for those who have to pay for the
hospital services OOP. The risk of CHE is immanent if
OOP payments exceed 15-20% of a household’s annual
income, depending on the threshold used [29-32]. The
income was taken here as the average income per capita
in 2008 (11,942,400VND) adjusted to US$ by PPP (equal
to US$1,553). With the average number of persons in
one household is 3.8 person [33] the average national
household income was equal to US$5,901 and average
near-poor household income was equal to US$1,596.
Regression models
Using the equation of multiple regressions on hospital
cost functions to calculate the final hospital unit costs:
Ri;t ¼ bo þ
X
bi;tXi;t þ ei
In which, Ri,t stands for the revenue of hospital i at
time t;
Xi,t: X1,t is predictor variable of inpatient bed day at
time t and X2,t is predictor variable of outpatient visit at
time t;
b0: the plane’s reference position (intercept) defines
the value of R when all Xi =0;
bi: a regression coefficient of the variable Xi on the
total revenue Ri that quantify the effects of inpatient bed
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revenue Ri, respectively; ei: error term [34,35].
Statistical analysis
The linear regression on the longitudinal/panel data
methodology was applied in STATA 10.0. Firstly, UF
revenue was regressed (fixed-effect) on the output vari-
ables of inpatient bed days (InpBD) and outpatient
visits (OutpV). Then, a similar regression was applied
for total revenue (i.e. UF and state budget) in the rela-
tionship with InpBD and OutpV. Those two models
resulted in the ratios of regression coefficients between
InpBD and OutpV interactions on UF revenue and on
total revenue respectively which suggests cost comple-
mentarities between InpBD, OutpV on UF revenue and
those on total revenue. These ratios were in turn used to
estimate the UF revenue/total revenue allocated relevant
to the unit costs of InpBD and OutpV (Table 1).
Similarly, the Regression Model (fixed-effect) was run
for InpBD on two variables of surgical and non-surgical
inpatient cases, to find the regression coefficient ratios
of length of stay (LOS) for one surgical case (SurInpC)
versus one non-surgical inpatient case (OtherInpC), that
were used to calculate the number of surgical inpatient
bed days (SurInpBD) and number of non-surgical bed
days (OtherInpBD). Those two variables (SurInpBD,
OtherInpBD) were then regressed on the UF revenue/
total revenue to find the ratios of regression coeffi-
cients of one SurInpBD and one OtherInpBD inter-
action on the cost of inpatient bed days in regard to UF
revenue and to total revenue, respectively. Then, rely-
ing on those regression coefficient ratios the total cost of
surgical and non-surgical inpatient bed days were calcu-
lated (Table 1).Table 1 Results of the regression models
Independent variables Revenue through user fees (UF)
Coefficient SE t/P-value
Dep Var: UF Revenue
R-sq: within = 0.63
InpBD 75.71 4.46 16.96/<.001
OutpV 15.42 4.26 3.61/<.001
Dep Var: InpBD
R-sq: within = 0.76
SurInpC 6.29 .624 10.07/<.001
OtherInpC 7.21 .320 22.53/<.001
Dep Var: Cost of inpatient bed days
R-sq: within = 0.46
SurInpBD .0001646 .0000199 8.27/<.001
OtherInpBD .0000446 .0000091 5.59/<.001
(Abbreviations: InpBD inpatient bed day, OutpV outpatient visit, SurInpC Surgical inp
inpatient bed day, OtherInpBD non-surgical inpatient bed day).All fixed-effect (within) regression were tested by a
Hausman Fixed Random test to make sure the difference
in coefficients between fixed-effect (within) regression and
random-effect GLS regression is not systematic [35,36].Results
From the baseline data:
The percentage of patients paying user fees through
OOP was 46.7% on average for out- and inpatient visits;
it declined from 56.2% in 2005 to 41.8% in 2008.
Conversely, the percentage of patients covered by TPP
increased from 43.8% to 58.2%. The LOS was almost
stable, in the range of 7.3-7.6 days at the provincial hos-
pital level and 9.6-10.4 days at the central hospital level
(Table 2).
From the Regression Model:
A significant linear regression was found between UF
revenue and two variables of InpBD and OutpV (both
variables, p < .001) and accounted for 63% of the vari-
ance in UF revenue (R2 = .63). Similar observations were
found for total revenue in the relationship with InpBD
and OutpV (R2 = .71; both variables, p < .001). The ratio
of regression coefficients between InpBD and OutpV
interactions on UF revenue is 75.71/15.42 and on total
revenue is 87.69/20.15 (Table 1).
Based on UF revenue, the variable costs of one InpBD
and OutpV were US$20.27 and US$4.13, respectively;
one SurInpBD cost US$47.50 versus US$12.87 for an
OtherInpBD. Comparing unit costs between different
hospital levels, the hospitals at the central level cost 2.5
times more than the ones at the provincial level (out-
patient visit: US$9.22/3.59, inpatient bed day: US$45.28/
17.64) (Table 3 ).Total revenue (UF plus state budget) = direct provider cost
Coefficient SE t/P-value
Dep Var: Total Revenue
R-sq: within = 0.71
87.69 4.35 20.15/<.001
20.15 4.16 4.84/<.001
Dep Var: Cost of inpatient bed days
R-sq: within = 0.40
.0001859 .0000229 8.11/<.001
.0000367 .0000091 4.00/<.001
atient case, OtherInpC non-surgical inpatient case, SurInpBD Surgical
Table 2 Hospital characteristics by year
Year Average length of stay (in days) % of patients for
whom user fees are
covered by TTP (n = 84)
All (n = 84) Province
(n = 76)
Central
(n = 8)
2005 7.7 7.4 10.4 43.8
2006 7.8 7.6 10.1 51.9
2007 7.7 7.5 10.0 57.2
2008 7.6 7.3 9.6 58.2
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InpBD cost US$36.66. Inpatient bed days for surgery
cost up to US$101.72 compared to US$20.08 for non-
surgery (Table 3). The share of user fees of the AFC dif-
fered among unit costs. On average, one OOP payment
or TPP covered 49.1% of the AFC of outpatient visits
and 55.2% of one inpatient bed day. The UF made up a
higher proportion of the AFC of different unit costs
at the central level compared to the provincial level,
ranging between 56.8 and 77.9% and 44.6 and 61.3%,
respectively. The highest share was for a non-surgical
bed day at the central level (77.9%) and the lowest share
for a surgical bed day at the provincial level (44.6%).
Impact implications:
In the estimation of the impact of sharing the unit
costs of hospital services, one inpatient treatment epi-
sode of surgical treatment at either central or provincial
hospital levels; and of a non-surgical treatment at central
hospital level immediately made the near-poor house-
holds who are uninsured and had to pay OOP for theTable 3 Means of unit costs for hospital services and percent
Hospital service and level Mea
By UF ≈ variable
costs [95% CI]
B
p
Outpatient visit
All 4.13 [3.76-4.49] 7
Provincial level 3.59 [3.35-3.83] 7
Central level 9.22 [6.59-11.85] 1
Inpatient bed day
All 20.27 [18.47-22.08] 3
Provincial level 17.64 [16.46-18.82] 3
Central level 45.28 [32.38-58.18] 6
Surgical inpatient bed day
All 47.50 [43.59-51.40] 9
Provincial level 41.70 [39.25-44.16] 8
Central level 102.53 [74.08-130.97] 1
Non-surgical inpatient bed day
All 12.87 [11.81-13.92] 1
Provincial level 11.30 [10.63-11.96] 1
Central level 27.78 [20.07-35.48] 3treatment at risk of CHE. Just one surgical inpatient
treatment at central hospital level exceeded the 15%
threshold of the household’s average annual income of
the whole population (in 2008) (Table 4).
Discussion
Information about hospital unit costs are key require-
ments for many types of decision making, serving as
input to assess the relative efficiency of treatment between
hospitals, and are essential for budgeting and planning
exercises [24]. The unit costs of inpatient bed days and
outpatient visits are often available in high-income coun-
tries. Unfortunately, it is rare in Vietnam or in similar
contexts in developing countries where the public hospital
cost data are mostly nonexistent [37]. To fill this gap,
using a large panel data of 4 consecutive years in 60% of
general hospitals in Vietnam, the results of the current
study reflect the real picture of Vietnam hospital health
care services. The main result found was that generally up
to 51% of outpatient visits and 45% of inpatient bed day
costs are directly supported by the government, either
through the state budget or through ownership and thus
being responsible for depreciation. This indicates a higher
proportion of hospital unit costs are covered by the gov-
ernment, compared to 30% of total health expenditure
covered by public expenditure on health [12]. The main
result in the current study was derived from a series of
results on different hospital unit costs, which were found
to be consistent with those of previous studies. The results
of studies conducted by the Ministry of Health in 2006age of UF per AFC of each unit cost
n of unit costs (US$) UF as%
of AFCy total revenue ≈ variable
lus fixed costs [95% CI]
Actual full
costs (AFC)
.76 [7.32-8.20] 8.41 49.10
.04 [6.72-7.35] 7.63 47.05
4.64 [12.03-17.25] 15.88 58.06
3.79 [31.87-35.70] 36.66 55.29
0.63 [29.27-31.99] 33.23 53.08
3.74 [52.38-75.10] 69.15 65.48
3.76 [88.93-98.58] 101.72 46.69
6.10 [82.73-89.47] 93.41 44.64
66.46 [136.03-196.89] 180.60 56.77
8.51 [17.55-19.46] 20.08 64.09
6.99 [16.33-17.66] 18.43 61.31
2.86 [26.85-38.86] 35.65 77.92
Table 4 User fees for surgical and non-surgical inpatient cases and their impact on users having to pay for the hospital
service OOP
Hospital service
and level
UF per
day (US$)
Average
LOS (days)
UF for whole treatment
episode (US$)
UF/annual income of
near-poor household (%)
UF/average income per
household in 2008 (%)
Surgical inpatient treatment case
Province 41.7 6.6 275.2 17.2 4.5
Central 102.5 8.7 891.7 55.8 15.1
Non-surgical inpatient
treatment case
Province 11.3 7.5 84.2 5.2 1.4
Central 27.7 10.4 288.1 18.1 4.8
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inpatient episodes) in provincial general hospitals to be
218,363VND (equal to US$36.8) [11]. Other studies by
the Ministry of Health in 2005 (data from 2003 from 30
provincial hospitals) found that one inpatient bed day
for surgery treatment (childbirth and appendicitis) cost
195,000VND (equal to US$33) and for internal treat-
ment in the range of 94,000-340,000VND (US$15.8-
57.4) [27]. At the central level, to our knowledge, there
is only one study by Flessa & Dung from 2004 which
gave results from Bachmai hospital, indicating that one
outpatient visit costs US$0.86 and one inpatient bed day
US$13.40 (those costs were converted to USD accord-
ing to the exchange rate, and by PPP they were equal
to US$2.3 for an outpatient visit and US$35.3 for an
inpatient bed day), of which the inpatient bed day cost
is consistent with our current results [13]. In compari-
son with other countries, our result is similar to the unit
costs of secondary level hospitals in the much higher GDP
per capita countries like Indonesia (cost of inpatient bed
day: US$35.1), Equador (US$35.9), and Romania (US
$39.0); and higher than those countries which have
approximately the same GDP per capita, such as Algeria
(cost of inpatient bed day: US$19.28) [37,1]. In compari-
son to the WHO categorized regions, our result is rela-
tively lower than that of Western Pacific Region B
(Vietnam belongs to this region) where an inpatient bed day
costs US$63, and an outpatient visit costs US$34. It is simi-
lar to the Eastern Mediterranean Region D (Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Iraq and Sudan, etc.) averages, though [38].
In consideration of DGS, for only one inpatient day of
surgery at the central level the government has to subsidize
up to US$78.07, that is as much as 10 outpatient visits at
the provincial level. This support could be crucial for the
poor or near-poor who have to pay for hospital services
by OOP payment. However, the use of medical services
(hospital admission) by the better off is 2.5-4.5 times
greater than that of the poor [12]. The insured have
almost twice the rate of admission than the uninsured
[7], and insurance coverage was higher among those
who have a higher ability to pay for health care [39].That clearly implied an inequity in the benefits of
hospital service utilization among different groups
within the population. The richer could pay for the
services but actually they gain greater benefit from
the direct support of the government, which was
originally targeted at the lower income group in the
population [12,40,41].
Policy implications: The findings of the paper offer
some suggestions for evidence-based policy solutions
that will help decrease the prevalence of catastrophic
health spending in Vietnam. One of three fundamental
concerns of the government in health financing sources
is to protect people from the financial consequences of
ill health and having to pay for health services [42], aside
from the poor who have been provided with free health
insurance. The remaining near-poor households, will be
subject to the negative impact of the FFS regime, that is,
to be at risk of CHE. The government should shift from
direct support to hospitals to the prepaid regime with
free health insurance which would provide a larger pro-
portion of the vulnerable group of low income people or
households with the benefit of increased access to health
care services.
The strength of our study is that the results relied on
the panel data of quite a large number of hospitals (60%
of the total number of general hospitals) in 4 consecu-
tive years which allowed us to capture the outcome
variation among hospitals caused by the differences
of unobservable determinants and the correlation
between differences of unobservable and observable
determinants of behavior [35].
However, the limitations of this article are that, firstly,
with the limited information on the health care system,
poor quality of hospital statistics, and the multi-stage
regressions used to estimate the unit costs, we were only
able to relatively calculate some basic unit costs neces-
sary for hospital policy considerations [6]. Secondly, the
output measured here may provide a relatively poor fit,
because the two groups of hospitals would have quite
different total costs, while the total number of bed days,
and also the number of outpatient visits, are the same
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as the estimation of under table payment, the drugs out
of hospital inventory which patient has to buy.
Conclusions
While around 45% of hospital AFC is paid by DGS, the
larger rest is covered by user fees. These have become
a great financial burden for the uninsured near-poor
households, as they have to pay for these out-of-pocket,
which either leads to CHE and/or to an under-utilization
of necessary services. If the rate of DGS were reduced, this
would have the effect of increasing UF, but the savings to
Government could be spent on subsidizing insurance to
ensure that a larger part of the population can cover UF
through insurance, especially the near-poor households,
and thus to reduce their risk of CHE and/or under-
utilization of services.
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